“Thin” ideology and climate policy support

While the literature on populism has a decades-long history, it is still a contested concept in terms of its content and meaning, as many conceptual and measurement issues remain unresolved [31, 32]. Due to its contested and ambiguous nature, a reasonable strategy is to adopt a minimalist definition focusing on ubiquitous elements that are, irrespective of the context, found in most populist discourses and rhetoric [33]. According to Rooduijn [31], “populism thus consists of at least two sub-dimensions: people-centrism and anti-elitism”. The people-centrism dimension focuses on a lack of external political efficacy, that is, the perception that while ordinary people should have the ultimate say in politics, politicians are unresponsive to the will of the people. The anti-elitism dimension focuses on political distrust and dissatisfaction with democracy, epitomizing the perception that people have been politically marginalized by an untrustworthy and corrupt political elite. This distinction is also evident in the definition provided by Mudde [34], which states that populism “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. However, due to its limited application to concrete political problems, populism is often referred to as a “thin” ideology that is often combined with a “thick” or “host” ideology with clearer implications for political decision making [30, 35].

Some conceptualizations and measurements of populist attitudes focus exclusively on external political efficacy [32] while others have a more narrow focus on public views about politicians’ trustworthiness, honesty, and competence [36]. However, indicators of external political efficacy and political trust have been shown to be closely associated with each other as well as with other populist dimensions, such as a Manichean worldview that perceives the world in terms of a fundamental conflict between good and evil [37, 38]. Moreover, research on voting behavior, predominantly in Western European countries, show that lack of external political efficacy and political distrust are both linked to voting for rightwing populist parties [39, 40], suggesting that people-centrism and anti-elitism constitute key ideological orientations among rightwing populist party supporters in Western Europe.

According to the logic of populism as a “thin” ideology, rightwing populists are typically hostile towards political initiatives to mitigate climate change because they view them as the result of political elite projects corrupted by special interests and nefarious “climate experts” rather than the people’s will [12]. Climate change skepticism and opposition to climate action among rightwing populists thus appear entrenched in anti-elitist and populist concerns as well as rejection of the political agenda of cosmopolitanism and global politics. It is therefore not surprising that rightwing populists reject the realities of climate change or oppose (especially international) efforts to address it.

Indeed, previous public opinion research on climate change has found links between populist attitudes and climate policy preferences. In a study using non-probability survey data from a web panel the UK, Huber [17] find that populist attitudes are associated with climate change skepticism and weaker support for environmental protection, even when controlling for traditional political ideology. In another study based on web panel data using survey experiments in the US, Huber et al. [18] similarly find evidence of a negative relationship between populism and support for government climate action as well as willingness to pay (e.g., higher taxes) to reduce emissions. While the authors find that populist attitudes undermine public support for various policy dimensions, they only find this relationship among respondents holding rightwing party sympathies, suggesting that rightwing populism constitutes a variety of populism particularly detrimental to climate action. Additional studies using cross-national European data have shown that people who hold anti-elitist sentiments, e.g., low trust in politicians and the political system, are less likely to support climate policies such as taxes on fossil fuels and subsidies on renewable energy [23, 24]. Finally, in a study based on a probability sample from a Dutch web panel, Meijers et al. (2023) [41] show that anti-elitist sentiments towards climate science and politicians mediate the effect of populist attitudes on climate policy evaluations. Based on the above, we therefore expect orientations associated with the “thin” ideology of rightwing populism to be negatively related to public support for climate policy.

“Thick” ideology and climate policy support

According to Mudde [34], the “thin” ideology of rightwing populism is typically combined with a “thick” or “host” ideology constituted by nativism and/or nationalism. Nativism tend to be defined as an ideology that prioritizes the interests and well-being of native-born of a given country over those of immigrants, typically manifested as xenophobic attitudes or demand for restrictions on immigration [42]. While rightwing populist parties in Western Europe all tend to adopt a general anti-immigrant (i.e., nativist) platform [43], studies on party politics and political manifestos demonstrate that these parties have become particularly characterized by (neo)nationalism—conceptualized as a boundary-maintenance project emphasizing the importance of sustaining a national way of life and a self-governing nation [44, 45]. This subset of nationalism centers on the idea that globalization and multiculturalism pose a threat to the economy, culture, and sovereignty of the nation state, typically manifested as opposition to EU-enlargement or negative perceptions regarding the consequences of immigration for the culture or economy [46]. Whereas rightwing populist parties in Western Europe have become increasingly characterized by a (neo)nationalist agenda, public opinion data has shown that this type of nationalist attitudes are closely linked to voting for rightwing populist parties [16, 44, 47].

While the literature on rightwing populism tends to emphasize the coexistence of populism and nativism/nationalism [42], most empirical studies conflate the two or study them separately [31, 48]. It is, however, theoretically and analytically meaningful to make a clear distinction between populism and for instance nationalism [49]. In disentangling the rightwing populism–climate change nexus, Lockwood [12] argues that focusing on the “thick” ideology of rightwing populism appear particularly fruitful, as it fills the “thin” ideology of rightwing populism with substance more clearly linked to issues of climate change. Indeed, the consequences of climate change—such as the need for global cooperation and international climate treaties that potentially undermine national sovereignty, or the moral imperative to accommodate climate migrants—provide powerful impetus for rightwing populists to reject the climate change agenda and to wave off calls for political action on climate change [12, 16].

In public opinion, nationalist sentiments often manifest as a defense of national sovereignty and protectionist measures aimed at safeguarding national culture and economy from perceived threats like international entities such as the EU or the potential adverse effects of immigration [34]. Previous research has linked nationalist and nativist attitudes to public opinion on climate change. In a study using a representative dataset from 23 European countries, Kulin et al. [16] find that attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are associated with both climate change skepticism and opposition to increasing taxes on fossil fuels, and that these relationships are particularly salient in Western European countries. Several studies have also found negative relationships between environmentalism or climate policy support and a variety of related measures, such as national collective narcissism [50, 51] or national ingroup identification (labelled nationalism) and mistrust for people of other nations [52].

A few studies have linked anti-immigrant attitudes, which according to Mudde [34] is a core dimension of nativism, to climate change denial/skepticism. In a study using representative data from Norway, Krange et al. [14] find that negative attitudes towards immigrants and asylum seekers are associated with climate change skepticism. Similarly, Jylhä and Hellmer [20] use a student sample from Sweden and find that exclusionism (which in their study include opposition to multiculturalism) is linked to climate change denial/skepticism. Finally, Fisher et al. [15] use data from the European Social Survey and find that negative attitudes towards immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe are associated with more skeptic beliefs, and less concern, about climate change. Although the mechanisms tying nativism (e.g., anti-immigrant sentiments) to for instance climate change denial are not entirely clear, the fact that the most dire consequences of climate change are imposed on people in the global south could make nativists, especially in a Western European setting, more prone to downplay the dangers of climate change or completely reject its reality. To summarize, we therefore expect orientations associated with the “thick” ideology of rightwing populism to be negatively related to climate policy support.

Anti-egalitarian, exclusionist and authoritarian orientations

Some studies on rightwing populism and public opinion on climate change also associate additional socio-political orientations to rightwing populism, such as authoritarian, exclusionary and anti-egalitarian orientations. Although the theoretical linkages remain somewhat elusive, several psychological studies investigate the role of ideologically charged personality traits commonly associated with rightwing populism, such as authoritarianism. For instance, Stanley et al. [53], find that authoritarian orientations—conceptualized as a preference for submission to authority—are related to climate skepticism. In their study of climate change denial, Jylhä and Hellmer [20] theoretically link both authoritarianism as well as exclusionary and anti-egalitarian attitudes (opposition to feminism, homosexuality and multiculturalism) to rightwing populism, but only find a relationship between the latter and climate change denial (for a similar study, see [54]). However, given that nativism is a core dimension of the “thick” ideology of right-wing populism, it is problematic to conflate opposition to multiculturalism with attitudes towards gender and sexuality, especially as it remains uncertain which factor primarily drives the results. Moreover, while these personality traits and orientations are frequently observed among rightwing populists, it is unclear if they are constitutive of its core ideology or if they simply serve as underlying psychological tendencies associated with broader conservative political orientations (cf. [55]). With regard exclusionary and anti-egalitarian attitudes (cf. [20]), it also makes sense to distinguish between exclusionary (e.g., patriarchal and heteronormative) orientations aimed at certain groups on the one hand, and anti-egalitarian orientations that oppose the equal treatment of all people on the other.

In Table 1, we provide a summary of key studies (discussed above) associating various orientations to rightwing populism and investigate their relationship to public opinion on climate change. In Fig 1, we also visualize all the above-mentioned orientations associated with rightwing populist ideology in a theoretical model.

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Fig 1. Theoretical model.

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Table 1. Studies focusing on rightwing populism and public opinion on climate change.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000443.t001

Ethics statement

The ESS data used in this study is publicly available and anonymized. Their surveys are conducted through face-to-face interviews, where participants are informed that their participation is voluntary and that they withdraw their participation at any time until the data is anonymized and published. Written informed consent to participate in the study was given by all participants. In accordance with the ESS ERIC Statutes (Article 23.3), the ESS ERIC subscribes to the Declaration on Professional Ethics of the International Statistical Institute. For more detailed information on research ethics in the ESS surveys, see the ESS website (https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/research-ethics).

Dependent variables

To measure public preferences regarding climate change mitigation policies, we use three items from the ESS dataset focusing on taxes on fossil fuels, subsidies on renewable energy, and bans on inefficient household appliances. All three items ask respondents “To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in [country] to reduce climate change?” for the following three items: “Increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal”, “Using public money to subsidise renewable energy such as wind and solar power”, and “A law banning the sale of the least energy efficient household appliances”. Answer alternatives range between 1–5, where 1 = “Strongly in favour”; 2 = “Somewhat in favour”; 3 = “Neither in favour nor against”; 4 = “Somewhat against”; 5 = “Strongly against”. To measure the overall tendency of individuals to favor climate policies, we use factor scores based on a principal component analysis (PCA) of these three items (reverse coded). The PCA showed that a single factor constitutes a relatively good representation of the data (Eigenvalue = 1.51, explained variance = 50.3%) and that each of the three manifest indicators load strongly on this factor (>0.69). The factor scores are standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1) and represent individuals’ scores on the climate policy support factor, with higher values indicating higher levels of support.

In a secondary analysis, we investigate whether the effects of orientations associated with rightwing populism remain consistent when alternating the dependent variable concerning public opinion on climate change. Considering that much of past research on various dimensions of rightwing populism, including anti-egalitarian and exclusionist attitudes as well as authoritarianism, has centered on climate change beliefs, in particular climate change skepticism or denial (e.g., [14, 20, 53]), we also construct a measurement of climate change beliefs using three items that capture people’s views along the three dimensions trend, attribution and impact (see [23, 57]). To measure the trend dimension of climate change beliefs, we used an item asking participants: “Do you think the earth’s climate is changing?” They could choose from the following options: 1 = “Definitely not changing”, 2 = “Probably not changing”, 3 = “Probably changing”, and 4 = “Definitely changing”. To measure beliefs about the causes of climate change (attribution), we presented the question, “Do you think climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both?” The response choices were: 1 = “Entirely by natural processes”, 2 = “Mostly by natural processes”, 3 = “About equally by natural processes and human activity”, 4 = “Mostly by human activity”, and 5 = “Entirely by human processes”. For gauging beliefs about the impacts of climate change, we utilized an item asking, “How good or bad do you think the impacts of climate change will be across the world?” The response scale ranged from 0 = “Extremely bad” to 10 = “Extremely good”, which we then reverse coded to correspond to the scales of the other items (higher values = stronger beliefs). In the ESS, respondents who answered “Definitely not changing” on the trend skepticism item were not asked the subsequent questions regarding attribution and impact skepticism, and have been excluded from the analyses. However, these respondents amount to less than 1% of the sample, as merely 290 out of 28032 respondents answered “Definitely not changing”. Consistent with prior studies that utilized these items to measure a single dimension of climate change beliefs/skepticism, a principal component analysis (PCA) identifies a single latent factor (Eigenvalue = 1.55) with strong factor loadings (>0.7) for all three observed items. Similar to the policy support measure detailed above, we use factor scores where higher values are indicative of believing in harmful and anthropogenic climate change.

Independent variables

Our main independent variables are constituted by various measures of different orientations associated with rightwing populism, which we will briefly describe below. All dimensions and sub-dimensions, as well as specific item wordings and response scales, can be found in S1 Table. For all multi-item measures, we used PCA (results presented in parentheses) to retrieve factor scores, which are standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1) and represent individuals’ scores on each of the orientations associated with rightwing populism. In the analyses, we use z-scores for single item measures in order to facilitate easy comparisons of effects across independent variables.

To measure attitudes consistent with the “thin” ideology of rightwing populism along the two populist dimensions people-centrism and anti-elitism (cf. [31]), we use items tapping external political efficacy (people-centrism) as well as political distrust and dissatisfaction (anti-elitism). External efficacy was measured using two items asking respondents whether they think that ordinary people have a say in what the government does and whether the political system allows people to have an influence on politics (Eigenvalue = 1.65, factor loadings>0.9, explained variance = 82.5%). To measure political distrust and dissatisfaction, we use two items asking respondents how much they personally trust politicians and parliament and two items that ask respondents about their satisfaction with government and democracy (Eigenvalue = 2.91, factor loadings>0.84, explained variance = 72.7%). Additionally, as an overall measure of the “thin” ideology of rightwing populism (people-centrism and anti-elitism), we use factor scores retrieved from a PCA analysis of all six items (Eigenvalue = 3.65, factor loadings = 0.70–0.84, explained variance = 60.8%).

To measure attitudes consistent with the “thick” ideology of rightwing populism along the two dimensions nativism and nationalism [34], we use the following items: Nativist attitudes was measured using two items asking respondents to what extent they think that their country should allow people to come and live here if they are either (1) of another race or ethnic group, or (2) from poorer countries outside Europe. We then obtained factor scores using PCA (Eigenvalue = 1.80, factor loadings>0.94, explained variance = 90.0%). Nationalist attitudes were measured using four items tapping public preferences for national sovereignty, cultural and economic protectionism, as well as national identity and attachment. As a measure of preferences for national sovereignty, we use an item asking respondents whether European unification should go further or whether it has gone too far. To measure cultural and economic protectionism, we use two items asking respondents whether their country’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched and whether it is generally bad or good for the national economy that people come to live there from other countries. To measure national identity and attachment (or, alternatively, anti-globalism), we use two items asking about respondents’ emotional attachment to their country, relative to their attachment to Europe. We then obtained factor scores based on a PCA analysis of all four items (Eigenvalue = 2.14, factor loadings = 0.57–0.82, explained variance = 53.5%). Additionally, as an overall measure of the “thick” ideology of rightwing populism (nativism and nationalism), we use factor scores based on all six variables (Eigenvalue = 3.16, factor loadings = 0.46–0.83, explained variance = 52.7%).

Authoritarianism is often conceptualized as a preferred social order based on social conformity at the expense of personal autonomy [58] or as a preference for submission to authority [53]. To measure authoritarianism, we therefore use an item from the Schwartz’ Human Values Scale in the ESS asking respondents whether they think it is important to obey authorities and conform to rules. At its essence, egalitarianism is an expression of a preference for a social order where everyone is entitled to the same rights and opportunities in life. To measure anti-egalitarianism, we use an item from the Schwartz’ Human Values scale asking respondents whether they think it is important that everyone should be treated equally and have equal opportunities in life. This item was coded so that higher values indicate anti-egalitarian views. To facilitate comparisons of the effects regarding various orientations, both these single item measures were standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1). Whereas some previous studies use a composite measure to capture anti-egalitarian and exclusionist attitudes in relation to both gender, sexuality and multiculturalism, we include a measure of exclusionism focusing exclusively on gender and sexuality, namely, attitudes towards feminism/patriarchalism and heteronormativity (Eigenvalue = 1.36, factor loadings>0.82, explained variance = 67.9%). Given our inclusion of nativism (that measures anti-immigrant attitudes separately) and a separate item measuring anti-egalitarianism, this strategy will enable distinguishing between these different constructs and examine their respective influence on climate policy preferences.

In the analyses, we control for political left-right ideology by including an item measuring subjective placement on the political left-right continuum. Political left-right (liberal-conservative) ideology arguably is one of the most commonly used measures of political orientations in survey research on public views about climate change [10, 59]. Previous research has found that the left-right political continuum in Western Europe, despite its varying interpretations, consistently encapsulates the central economic and cultural conflicts in different countries, making it a useful tool for cross-national comparative analysis [60]. Indeed, studies have found cross-national differences in terms of the meanings people ascribe to the left-right continuum, although in a European context, these differences are most accentuated between Western and Eastern European countries [61, 62]. To measure political ideology, we include an item asking respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging between 0 and 10, where 0 =“Left”and 10 =“Right”. To facilitate comparisons with orientations associated with rightwing populism, the measure was standardized (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1). Finally, we also include the following socio-demographic control variables: gender (0 =“woman”, 1 =“man”) age (years), education (years), and income (deciles). In S2 Table, we present descriptive statistics for all variables in the analyses (except socio-demographic controls).

Limitations and future research

A potential limitation of this study is the omission of additional right-wing populist orientations, beyond the one’s examined here. One such orientation is social dominance orientation (SDO), which favors group hierarchies and the dominance of some groups over others, which (it has been argued) may also extend to views about the right of humans to dominate the environment and the climate. However, while SDO has been theoretically linked to rightwing populism and empirically studied in relation to climate change denial/skepticism, most studies find weak or no effects of SDO [19, 20]. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that while we do not claim to have incorporated all relevant orientations associated with rightwing populism in our analyses, we have attempted to include as many rightwing populist orientations as possible given the currently available cross-national data. Considering that we have been able to include a substantial number of indicators for orientations closely associated with both the “thin” and “thick” ideology of rightwing populism, we believe our study speak to the complexities and nuances in the relationship between rightwing populism and public opinion about climate change. Moreover, considering that the ESS data (Round 8) is now 7–8 years old, our study might not reflect current conditions, where rightwing populist parties with a nationalist/nativist rhetoric have not only cemented their positions in mainstream politics in many Western European countries but also strengthened their profile as the main antagonists to the climate change agenda. A crucial task for future studies, therefore, is to investigate (once newer cross-national data becomes available) how climate policy attitudes are affected by the continuing development of rightwing populism in Western Europe.

Another limitation concerns the specific operationalization of various orientations associated with rightwing populism. On the one hand, using representative data from the European Social Survey is a notable strength of our study, providing an expansive view of orientations associated with right-wing populist ideology, surpassing the scope of many previous studies. On the other hand, while the ESS allows us to explore multiple dimensions or orientations simultaneously, a potential limitation arises in the operationalization of some of these orientations, since the number of available indicators per construct is limited. Moreover, using measurement instruments based on a larger number of manifest indicators than those available in the ESS would also allow for the testing of measurement equivalence across countries, which is currently not possible.

For instance, using a more comprehensive and validated measurement instrument to capture populist attitudes, including a Manichean worldview [39], might have yielded different results. At the same time, since most dimensions of populism tend to be highly correlated [37, 38] and that “it has still not been shown convincingly that the populist attitude really differs from other attitudinal constructs like ‘political cynicism’ or ‘external efficacy’” [31], we believe our results provide important insights about the association between the “thin” ideology of populism and climate policy preferences across a large number of Western European countries. Nevertheless, future studies should strive to include as many exhaustive and established measurement instruments as possible regarding rightwing populist orientations while also taking into consideration the interrelationship between different populist dimensions (which has not been considered here, but see [65]). Hence, this study should primarily be considered as a first attempt at widening the scope, in the study of rightwing populism and public opinion on climate change.

It could be argued that another potential limitation is that the measures of climate policy preferences in the ESS only refer to certain policies—such as fossil fuel taxes or subsidies for renewable energy—and that the inclusion of preferences in relation to other policies might have produced different results regarding the effects of nationalist and populist attitudes. In particular, future studies should focus on policy preferences in relation to other measures that can be expected to have a substantial impact on emissions reductions, such as bans on internal combustion engine vehicles and just transition policies aiming to compensate workers during the transition or loss and damage in the disproportionally affected global south (cf. [66]). Future research on rightwing populism and climate policy support should therefore aim to include a wider set of climate policy preferences, if and when such cross-national data becomes available. Nevertheless, we believe our results contribute to the understanding about the prerequisites for achieving decarbonization and sustainable societies, since carbon pricing and incentivizing transition to sustainable energy production and usage arguably constitute key policies to meet emissions reduction targets [67].

Finally, previous research shows that both populist and nationalist sentiments are characterizing features of Western European rightwing populist parties and their voters [40, 44], several public opinion studies demonstrate that such attitudes are not necessarily exclusive to rightwing populist voters [68, 69]. In fact, the electoral successes of rightwing populist parties to a great extent rely on mobilizing already existing attitudes and sentiments in the population [33, 70]. While previous research has not been able to tie the size of rightwing populist parties across national contexts to public views about climate change [71], research on elite framing suggest that rightwing populist parties could exert a broader influence on the political discourse and debate through their issue positions and rhetoric [72, 73]. Given the established influence of political elite framing and rhetoric on public views about climate change [74], rightwing populist parties and politicians very likely provide cues and articulate opposition to climate policies based on their core ideology [28], which then fuel such sentiments in the broader public, even beyond their narrow share of voters. Future research should aim to disentangle these effects across rightwing populist voters and non-voters, as well as devoting special attention to exploring the potential role of elite framing and rhetoric in tying populist and nationalist discourses to climate change issues.