Village selection.

Villages across the four countries of the Lake Chad region were systematically chosen to ensure a representative sample of communities affected by the crisis. This selection process was informed by the expertise of the local research team, deeply embedded within the region, who strategically identified locations accessible due to security and environmental conditions, communities experiencing varying degrees of conflict and climate change affectations. Considerations such as geographic diversity, livelihood strategies (e.g. fishing and farming) and the severity of the crisis were considered to ensure a comprehensive representation of the affected population.

Interview respondent selection.

The principles of inclusivity and diversity guided the selection of survey respondents. Our local research team conducted interviews with individuals from different demographic backgrounds, including varying ages, genders, occupations, religions, and ethnolinguistic groups. This approach aimed to capture a wide range of perspectives and experiences, encompassing the diverse realities of those affected by the Lake Chad crisis. Special attention was given to including voices from vulnerable groups such as refugees, internally displaced persons, and host communities.

The final sample comprised participants from four countries of the Lake Chad region: In Niger (n = 46), Nigeria (n = 90), Chad (n = 39), and Cameroon (n = 57) (See Table B to E in S1 Text). The sample represented a diverse array of ethnic groups including Kanuri, Fulani, Hausa, Toubou, Arab, Buduma, Shuwa Arab, Kanembu, Zakawa, Mandara, Massa, Tupuri, Fulbe, and Moundam. As well as various livelihoods such as pastoralists, farmers, fisherfolk, traders, services, NGOs, public officials, and participants from various religious backgrounds. In addition to community interviews, our study engaged with a diverse array of stakeholders at various levels, including government officials, community leaders, and representatives from international organizations and NGOs such as UNDP, UNHCR, UN OCHA, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. A full characterization breakdown is provided in the annexes. These engagements facilitated a comprehensive understanding of the multi-faceted dimensions of the crisis and provided valuable insights into the responses and interventions implemented by key actors. (See Table A in S1 Text). The semi-structured interviews cover the following topics: community identities and relations, conflict dynamics, livelihoods, key actors’ perceptions of climate change and future trajectories.

Extracting relevant quotes.

For each theme, illustrative quotes were meticulously extracted to provide direct evidence and enrich the narrative with the participants’ voices. These quotes were carefully selected to highlight key insights and exemplify the identified themes. By grounding the analysis in the participants’ own words, the study ensured that the diverse experiences and perceptions of those affected by climate change and conflict in the Lake Chad region were accurately and meaningfully represented.

Policy document analysis.

Finally, to triangulate data, a thorough document analysis of existing government policies including National Adaptation Programmes, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and international organisations and NGOs were conducted (see S2 Text). The analysis followed the research questions of the UNEP adelphi tool kit for addressing climate-fragility risks, making emphasis in how policy can be translated into practice [18]. This process informed the identification of the presented climate fragility clusters to develop policy solutions.

Integration of the assessments into the manuscript.

Following the workshop, a collaborative and iterative writing phase among the leading authors facilitated the integration of findings from fieldwork and workshop outcomes into the manuscript, mainly summing up the revision of governmental policies, including National Adaptation Programmes, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and international organizations and NGOs. Furthermore, an iterative process took place with experts from the region and the feedback received, including insights from Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria stakeholders, which was diligently incorporated into the article to ensure its robustness and relevance.

The rise and containment of armed opposition groups.

The current conflict in the Lake Chad region was triggered by violence linked to armed groups including Jama’atu Ahl al -Sunna li -l- Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad (JAS), known as Boko Haram, and Wilayat al Islamiyya Gharb Afriqiyyah (Islamic State West Africa, ISWAP). Whilst violence was triggered in 2009, the crisis is rooted in longstanding developmental challenges, namely widespread inequality and decades of political marginalization, which entrenched a sense of exclusion and mistrust between communities and leaders in the region [22].

JAS, which originated in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria’s Borno state in the northeast, was founded in 2002. Its initial objectives were to demonstrate against the corruption and inequities perpetuated by state structures and to promote a return to traditional Islamic values. However, over time, JAS’s ideology and methods have undergone continual transformation [22]. They gained considerable support among the population in these early days, harnessing people’s frustration with Nigeria’s nascent but seemingly unresponsive democracy.

While originating in Borno, Nigeria, armed opposition groups have declared control over territory and spread to neighbouring countries, setting off bombs through ‘suicide’ bombers, forced recruitment, kidnapping, and violence against women and girls, including sexual violence and forced marriage [22]. Attacks have occurred in northern Cameroon since March 2014 and in southern Niger and western Chad since early 2015. Combatants move freely across national borders. They have some support from local populations in all four countries, although continuing attacks against civilians direct much anger against them [19]

While the emergence of JAS and ISWAP (a breakaway faction of JAS) were not directly linked to climate change, it is important to understand that poverty, livelihood insecurity, and the lack of state support and governance in the highly climatically vulnerable region was part of the background against which they emerged.

Conflict dynamics.

The pre-existing tensions between the state, vigilante groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a volunteer force primarily composed of young individuals working with the military, and armed opposition groups have been further exacerbated by the ongoing conflict. This has not only led to the emergence of new conflicts and rivalries within and between communities but also prompted communities to unite against common dangers. Throughout these situations, the experiences of men, women, boys, and girls have varied significantly [22].

Furthermore, although people of all religions have experienced the impact of violent conflict, relations between Christians and Muslims have become strained in some areas. In others, people have united across religious lines against what has been seen as a common enemy, with Christians and Muslims jointly fighting armed opposition groups through joining vigilante groups.

In Cameroon the conflict has led to increased ethnic and social tensions, partly due to the impact on the economy, increased local inter-communal tensions and exacerbated violence over access to resources in Niger. Conflict has also led to the emergence of new stigmatisation and rivalry over the control of economic activities and land ownership in Chad [23]. The conflict has also affected relations between internally displaced people (IDPs) and host communities. Traditionally, host communities provide shelter and support to those displaced from other locations. As the crisis evolved, this has strained traditional norms of hospitality, leading to tensions and localised conflict as hosts have exhausted their own resources in order to accommodate IDPs. As a farmer from Nigeria mentioned, “The pastoralists see the refugees as ruining their grasslands. The refugees, in turn, need to sell grass to survive. Previously, only the Fulani cut down trees and sold the wood in N’guimi, often trading it for food rather than money. Now, the refugees and IDPs have cut down all the trees around N’guimi, impacting the environment. This deforestation has made it impossible for the local people to graze their animals around the town as they used to” (Farmer participant from Nigeria, personal communication, 2018). Tensions are further exacerbated in many cases by humanitarian assistance seen as only benefitting IDPs despite the impact of the violent conflict on everyone in the area.

Conflict has changed gender roles in conflict affected areas. Young men are often the first to flee insecure areas, and are deliberately targeted and killed by armed opposition groups, viewed with suspicion, arrested and detained by security agencies, and involved in fighting [24]. Consequently, women make up the majority of the population in many areas. As a result, they have taken up new types of economic activities and decision-making roles. Even when present, men are no longer able to provide for families, forcing women to find ways of earning incomes, including through survival sex. There is concern from both women’s and men’s groups about women’s economic empowerment leading to disrespect in the home and taking women away from domestic concerns [25].

Into this mix, there is growing frustration with many community leaders. In some areas, they had lost legitimacy and trust even before the violence, being viewed by community members as corrupt and politicised, and with community conflict management systems significantly weakened [26,27]. These dynamics have been sharpened by community leaders leaving the area during the insecurity and so being seen to have abandoned their people, their inability to act decisively to stop violence, and their involvement in diversion of humanitarian aid.

Finally, although large-scale disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration processes are only just getting started, tensions continue between families of presumed armed opposition group members and those harmed by violence, with widespread suspicion and mistrust in some communities as to who may be a sympathiser or member. Women and girls associated with armed opposition groups often face marginalisation, discrimination, and rejection by family and community members, and are viewed with fear that they have been radicalized [19,28]. While it is true that there is relatively less stigma and discrimination associated with joining vigilante groups, there are legitimate concerns about the future trajectories of the individuals involved in these groups. Specifically, there is a risk that they may become more prone to engaging in violent acts and refuse to relinquish the power and influence they have gained through fighting. Moreover, regardless of how they are viewed by the wider community, anyone who is associated with armed groups has either been a victim of, or actively participated in, violent activities—with the impact of such experiences differing significantly between men, women, boys, and girls. It is likely that these individuals will continue to suffer from psychological trauma as a result of their experiences [19,29].

Violence, human rights abuses and displacement.

Civilian harm has been committed by all conflict-parties in the region. Approximately equal numbers of people were reported as killed by armed opposition groups and security forces [30] JAS and ISWAP have conscripted or systematically executed men and boys, abducted, imprisoned, raped and forcibly married women and girls, who have also been forced to participate in armed attacks, killed civilians, and looted and burned property and crops [31]. National militaries have failed to protect communities from violence, committing civilian harm during the course of operations by directly targeting civilians, using torture and excessive force [32]. Meanwhile, the CJTF in particular has been implicated in extra-judicial killings, harassment of communities, sexual exploitation and abuse, recruitment and use of children, and diversion of humanitarian aid. As noted by a farmer from Niger: “Most women are prostituting themselves now, whereas they didn’t before. This is happening because they don’t have money and need to survive. It’s specifically the Buduma women who are engaging in this. A youth committee conducted research and found that only Buduma women are involved in this activity. The Buduma have been particularly affected because they used to live by Lake Chad, but due to the crisis, they’ve had to move to N’guimi” (Trader from Niger, personal communication, 2018). There has been massive displacement. People in areas that have seen attacks have fled their homes to their own or neighbouring local government area’s headquarters, state capitals, different parts of their countries and to other countries. Some parts of Borno, the epicentre of the north-east conflict, see fighting for territory and are completely inaccessible to humanitarian action.

There is also significant movement across borders. For example, since early 2015, Cameroon has deported at least 100,000 Nigerians living in remote border areas, with soldiers using extreme physical violence in order to do so [33]. At the same time, the army’s aggressive screening of newly arriving Nigerians at the border has included torture and other rights violations, and housing them in remote villages and settlements to which humanitarian actors are denied access [34] An interviewed participant farmer from Chad also mentioned: “when Boko Haram came, nobody can fish as you like and the traders cannot buy the fish, since they are not working, they became poor and people cannot feed. There is no possibility to get fish for eating, there is no possibility to buy fish for selling. Many things have changed; even the population. The negative impact of this situation impacts the population directly. And people are going far away from here to inside to cultivate where the water decreased” (Farmer and trader from Nigeria, personal communication, 2018).

1. Climate change and ecological changes increase livelihood insecurity.

Many people living around the lake have mixed livelihoods, making their living by combining fishing, agriculture, livestock farming, and trade, often switching at different times of the year. Most livelihoods are climate-sensitive, but people have changed occupations for generations in response to lake and climate variation. For example, people would traditionally shift from flood-recession agriculture to livestock farming and fishing when the risk of early flooding seems high. People would also migrate during flood recession, especially around the northern pool where flood variability is highest, to nearby towns or the lake’s southern pool for more significant farming opportunities.

Currently, climate change impacts the Sahelian zone of west-central Africa with higher year to year variability in the amount of precipitation during rainy seasons [10]. The intense climate variability affecting the central Sahel plays out in the Lake Chad region in the fluctuating size of the northern pool and increasing unpredictability of when and how much rain falls. Furthermore, because of the shallowness of the lake and higher ambient temperatures, vegetation cover is increasing, particularly in shallow areas. As a result, this slows water movement across the lake and hampers fishing, boat transport and mobility [5]. Thus, Climate variability and change combined with conflict have substantial implications for livelihoods and these coping mechanisms [19,35].

Interviewees reported that pastoralist face severe challenges coming from climate change as their animals die from hunger and thirst due to lack of water and pasture exacerbated by higher temperatures. As a result, pastoralists and their animals remain closer to more populated areas, compounding the stress on accessible, fertile land. Research for this assessment found that many people who previously made their livelihoods from fishing have been moved away from water bodies due to growing vegetation.

Similarly, farmers are also facing climate change related affectations to their livelihood activities. In the poignant words of a young male farmer in Monguno, Nigeria:

"Before, we had three farming options. The first was during the rainy season. If the rain stopped, we were okay because we could go for our second option: farming irrigated by the stream, which does not require rain. If the stream dried up, we could go to the third–to Lake Chad to plant rice. Of course, the lake keeps changing, so that is never certain, but all three disasters would not hit you in the same year. But now, we cannot do this. Due to the crisis, every economic avenue has been destroyed, and virtually all economic activities have collapsed. If one option fails- likely because of rainfall, security restrictions and armed fighters—you cannot do others" (Farmer participant from Nigeria, personal communication, 2017). Another farmer from Cameroon also noted that “The crops that have more impact is maize and for space for example if there are more rains you can have 8 or 9 bags of your maize but if there are no rains you will just have only one bag” (Farmer participant from Cameroon, personal communication, 2018).

As climate change pressures livelihoods, such as fishing and farming, by changing cropping patterns, planting times, or grazing routes, participants reported a clear increase in conflicts over resources such as grazing land, water access and fishing. Traditional mechanisms for resolving such disputes, such as compensation, are no longer proving effective or workable, as people no longer have sufficient assets to draw upon to compensate other parties.

These pressures lead to decreasing social cohesion and increasing tensions and conflicts at all levels of society. The research found that at the household level, inter-generational tensions and increased domestic violence increase as strained livelihoods challenge traditional conceptions of masculinity and ‘manhood’. Between and within different identity groups, such as IDPs, host communities, and occupational groups, pre-existing grievances are more prone to escalate as climate risks compound grievances and conflict resolution mechanisms become less viable. Moreover, strains on the social contract grow between people and the state as climate-fragility pressures magnify shortcomings in governance and basic service provision. Notably, the increasing climate variability, as represented in changing rainfall patterns and hotter temperatures rather than the change in lake levels poses the most significant challenges. Rather than constituting an unmitigated disaster, the lake’s past shrinking had significant positive effects in opening fertile land for recession crops and pasture, leading to net in-migration [3,36]. As a woman farmer participant from Chad mentioned, about her perception on rainfall patterns: “There is change. This change, before when I was a child, there is abundant rain. People were cultivating millet everywhere, you can harvest and it stays for one year. Now, the millet and the maize all together they cannot stay for one year. Everybody is crying during the period, there is no millet, there is no maize, crying. And the sun also became very hot now. Before the sun was not like this. I don’t know whether the population increased or God was angry and he sent some punishment, I don’t know but the situation is this” (Woman farmer participant from Chad, personal communication, 2017).

However, other sectors, especially fishing and irrigated agriculture, have intermittently lost out. Whereas greater annual fluctuation can offer benefits regarding the fertility of the land for recession agriculture, the uncertainty about variation brings significant livelihood risks as the communities cannot plan their activities accordingly. It also remains to be seen how this ecosystem can maintain a rapidly increasing population, which has tripled over the past 40 years. Furthermore, water system governance and environmental law in the region are weak. Human activities such as unregulated deforestation and fishing are affecting the lake’s sustainability. Moreover, residents report that officials responsible for monitoring water delivery and taxes operate without accountability, resulting in decreased trust in the government. The standard irrigation method, flooding irrigation, contributes to significant water losses, evapotranspiration, and runoff. Extensive irrigation schemes like the South Chad Irrigation Project (SCIP) have been implemented, causing the lake to shrink to the point where rainy-season rice cultivation is impossible, and dry-season wheat production is limited. All of this is exacerbated by unpredictable scarcity and uneven distribution of rainfall patterns [37,38]. A woman farmer from Chad mentioned in this regard: “When I was a child, they were cultivating many things: sugar cane, many things, various things. But since they made the dams, water is going back and the land became dry. And apart from this dam we don’t know any other thing. I think it is the dam” (Woman farmer participant from Chad, personal communication, 2017). Similarly, a community leader from the Lake Chad region noted that: “the irrigation systems built along the shore for agriculture have lacked maintenance, leading to non-functional, outdated pumps”. Consequently, the canals have dried up, adversely affecting the villagers’ livelihoods (Community leader working for a local NGO across the Lake Chad region, personal communication, 2018).

2. Vulnerability heightens as conflict and fragility strain coping capacities.

The population’s ability to adapt to climate change has significantly decreased due to conflicts, leaving them highly susceptible to climate shocks. This vulnerability hinders their opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and development, which are crucial for promoting peace and stability. In the case of communities residing around Lake Chad, these vulnerabilities materialize in four distinct ways.

First, armed opposition groups and state security forces increasingly restrict people’s access to natural resources, fishing areas, and agricultural land where they need to pursue their livelihoods. A fisher man noted: “The new fishing rules from the militaries, where we need to pay big amounts of money or a control tax have forced the people to leave to other regions” (Fisherman participant from Chad, personal communication, 2017).

People have shifted livelihoods to cope with climate and weather variability in the past, but now this strategy is less viable due to restricted access to land and water. Simultaneously, the greater unpredictability of rainfall and changes in seasonal patterns have diminished the feasibility of conventional means of livelihoods. For example, local farmers have described how the traditional model of shifting between different agricultural practices depending on the rain cannot function under the weather extremes and variability of the past years. The challenges are being aggravated by the military’s tactics, such as the destruction or limitation of high-yield crops such as maize and the clearance of forests as a component of their counter-insurgency operations [19].

Second, the large-scale movements of people and displacement have left many groups extremely vulnerable. These population groups need access to natural resources, for example, land for subsistence agriculture, which form the basis for their livelihoods. Unable to work, they often depend on humanitarian aid for survival. A woman in Niger noted: “My request to the government is food and water, we are hungry but also need capital for business” (Woman in displacement condition from Chad, personal communication, 2018).

Many of these people have been displaced multiple times. Due to displacement, the financial resources of affected individuals are depleted, resulting in a lack of preparedness to handle future pressures. In areas where they settle, there is growing competition for natural resources between host communities and displaced populations. This competition, coupled with firewood consumption for cooking, is causing deforestation and natural resource degradation, which is reducing the resilience of both displaced individuals and host communities [5].

Groups that are especially susceptible to the adverse effects of the crisis are those who are confined and cannot escape, and have no access to humanitarian aid because they are located in remote areas of Lake Chad. A notable example is the small islands situated in the lake that have been utilized as havens by armed opposition groups [19].

Third, the crisis has had an adverse effect on the social cohesion of resilient communities, which is a crucial asset. Within communities, as well as between different population groups and between the population groups and the government, social cohesion has been diminished. Suspicion and mistrust have risen among and between communities, including between Muslims and Christians, as well as individuals and groups that are perceived as being associated or supporters of armed opposition groups. This has negative implications for cooperation within and between communities, resulting in their decreased resilience to shocks and pressures. Additionally, the conflict has caused the breakdown of conventional governance structures, as traditional leaders have either been eliminated, relocated or have lost their credibility, creating a power vacuum and weakened community leadership [19,34]. As a farmer from Nigeria mentioned, “Before, Muslims and Christians were living in good terms, but from the beginning of the Boko Haram started to target Christians until when things become terrible on their own part to a point that they can kill anyone. But you know that even till date that their basic target and their first target is Christians” (Farmer participant from Nigeria, personal communication, 2017).

Fourth, already strained relations between different groups and the government have further deteriorated. Human rights abuses and the indiscriminate military interventions by state security institutions have sown further distrust. It has impeded efforts to address conflict and climate risks.

3. Resource conflicts rise due to scarcity.

Participants reported that conflict over natural resources between occupational groups such as farmers, pastoralists, fisherfolk, and hunters, has been exacerbated by reduced availability of arable land, the planting of crops on areas designated for grazing, the impact of changing rainfall patterns on crop yields and the health of cattle, military constraints, and water scarcity due to the influx of a large number of IDPs in the region.

The impact of climate change will exacerbate the demand for natural resources, including land and water. Climate change-induced changes in the availability and access to natural resources are creating winners and losers in Lake Chad. For example, a fisherman participant from Chad mentioned that, “There is more people coming to fish to our area and there is less fish. Before I was able to fill my boat, now the nets often come out empty, and the next generation is looking elsewhere, there is no money on fishing” (Fisherman participant from Chad, personal communication, 2017). And, considering the political economy of the conflict, whereby conflict actors tend to profit by controlling access to natural resources and long-standing exclusion and marginalization, these changes in access and availability of natural resources pose a considerable risk of conflict [5].

Conflicts over natural resources, particularly land and water, have been on the rise and are likely to escalate further. These conflicts involve various occupational groups, such as farmers and pastoralists. As the conflict with armed opposition groups subsides, people will be able to return to their livelihoods, potentially leading to an increase in conflicts over natural resources. Such conflicts can further intensify tensions between displaced population groups and host communities, increasing competition for limited resources. This, combined with dysfunctional traditional governance mechanisms and damaged community relationships, exacerbates conflict escalation [19].

4. Livelihood insecurity fuel recruitment into armed groups.

According to ex-combatants interviewed in our research, income and the offer of food are pull factors for joining armed groups. With the significant impact of climate change on livelihoods in the region, economic insecurity and lack of opportunities can be exploited by non-state armed groups. These groups offer financial incentives and alternative livelihoods to those who face social and economic inequality, have limited options due to changes in their occupation, and have been enticed by the financial rewards offered by these groups in the past. This is especially true for young men who may feel blocked from achieving traditional markers of adulthood and economic stability, such as marriage and starting a family, due to financial constraints [25].